CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

I solicited this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the academic community because recent events here have sparked a broader discussion of both the propriety and wisdom of university scholars cooperating or collaborating in any way with American intelligence. Indeed, on December 3rd of last year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar who works for a government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar." These are strong words. While in my view they are indefensible, they reflect concerns that should be addressed.

I intend tonight to speak about the pattern over time of CIA's ties to the academic community, our reasons for seeking contact with you, the concerns scholars and the media have about such links, and our policies governing these ties. I will be happy then to take questions for a few minutes.

The History of CIA-University Relations

In discussing the relationship between the academic community and American intelligence, it is important to go back to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links to Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan, a World War I hero and successful New York lawyer, persuaded President Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving

world events. He proposed creating an organization that would report to the White House and "which could draw on the universities for experts with long foreign experience and specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and created the Office of the Coordinator of Information under Donovan's leadership.

Donovan named James Finney Baxter III, President of Williams College and an expert on American diplomatic history, as the chairman of a board of analysts that would draw together information relevant to the course of the war. Baxter in turn recruited a Harvard historian, William L. Langer, as the Director of Research. The two then set to work to invite outstanding scholars in the social sciences to join their board of analysts and enlist additional staff.

There is an interesting sidelight to this. One of the reasons the new organization was exempted from Civil Service regulations on hiring and pay was that Langer and other professors could not afford to join a Civil Service where the top salary was $8,500--less than they were earning in their academic posts. Donovan went to Roosevelt and obtained an exemption from Civil Service regulations, allowing the Office of the Coordinator of Information to match university salaries.

Donovan clearly had a high opinion of scholarship and the contribution that quality minds from America's universities could make to the work of the Office of Strategic Service, as the intelligence organization was renamed in 1942. As a result, a

large number of university professors were brought into the OSS, including G. T. Robinson, professor of Russian history at Columbia (who was made chief of the Russian section); Hajo Holborn, professor of history at Yale; Franz Neumann of the New School for Social Research; and, interestingly, Herbert Marcuse, whose later revolutionary views presumably were not then evident. Harvard made no small contribution to this intellectual talent bank, contributing scholars such as Crane Brinton and H. Stuart Hughes in history, Carlton Coon in anthropology, John King Fairbank in oriental studies, Bruce Hopper in government, Henry Murray in psychology, and others as well.

The U.S. military during the war had grave reservations about these scholars, and were especially worried about their failure to appreciate adequately the need for security. General Donovan once angrily told Langer that although the scholars no doubt were smart, they were not discreet. He said, "They are like chorus girls who have beautiful legs and like to show them."

This is not the time or place to detail their contribution. Let us simply say it was significant. And when the war was over, most of the scholars demobilized, along with the nation's soldiers.

Events in East and West Europe, the Soviet Union and China between 1945 and 1947 made apparent the need to strengthen the nation's defenses, and especially the need to be well-informed about developments around the globe. The result was the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Department of Defense and

the Central Intelligence Agency. Again, outstanding scholars were recruited. Langer was brought back to establish the Office of National Estimates. Other academicians who joined up included: historians such as Ludwell Montague, Sherman Kent, and DeForrest Van Slyck; MIT economist Max Millikan, who organized the economic intelligence effort; Yale and MIT economist Richard Bissell, who later headed the clandestine service; and even William Sloan Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to join CIA for the duration of the Korean War before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He told "Beetle" Smith he joined the Agency because "Stalin made Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason for academicians to join the Agency in the early years. Again, the number of scholars in the leadership of the new CIA was disquieting to the Pentagon. General Smith once quoted some of his erstwhile uniformed colleagues as saying that the new Agency hierarchy was "a wild eyed bunch of intellectuals whose colleges don't want them back."

In short, in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and in the early days of CIA, prominent scholars from America's greatest universities played a key role in the establishment of the Agency itself and in particular its research and analysis branch.

Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war was at its height and the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom questioned by faculty or students. These halcyon days were soon to change. There was some criticism on campuses over CIA's

involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961 and criticism increased as the Agency, along with the Department of Defense and the rest of the government, was increasingly attacked as the war in Vietnam continued. Despite instances of continuing academic cooperation with the Directorate of Intelligence, relations with academia generally deteriorated in the early- to mid-1960s. This was given impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in Ramparts magazine that CIA had been funding the National Student Association for a number of years. Picketing of recruiters began in 1966 and peaked in 1968 when there were 77 incidents or demonstrations.

Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA began to emerge in the media in the early 1970s leading to the establishment of the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives. These bodies concentrated primarily on CIA's covert actions, although there was some discussion--particularly in the Church Committee--which tended to lump relations with schools along with the media and religious organizations. Professor Langer, writing his memoirs in 1977, expressed with some relief that "I am very proud that in these days of controversy and delation, the key parts of intelligence evaluation that was worked out in R and A and then perfected in the early days of the CIA has remained essentially untouched." And, indeed, the Church Committee recognized that CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce."

At the same time, the Church Committee recommended that that advice and judgment be openly sought. The Committee concluded by placing the principal responsibility for altering the existing relationship between CIA and academe on the backs of the college administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of ... the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members."

This paralleled ~~set off a~~ considerable debate within academic ranks and ~~led to~~ numerous articles about the relationship between the universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President of the American Association of University Professors, CIA's Director at that time replied that the Agency sought "only the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director stated that where relationships are confidential they are usually so at the request of the scholars rather than the Agency and he refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best scholars in our country."

This approach was adopted and enlarged upon by Director Stansfield Turner who engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with President ~~Bach~~ Bok of Harvard on relations between this university and the Agency. While some academic institutions took actions toward the adoption of guidelines similar to the stringent regulations established at Harvard, in most cases modifications were included. Moreover, in a great majority of schools where the issue arose, the faculty

and administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the grounds that existing regulations or practices were adequate to protect both the institution and individuals from corruption.

Relations between the Agency and the academic world have slowly improved since 1977. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA on many campuses. Indeed, the history of relations between CIA and the academe appears to show a pattern of close ties during periods of heightened tension between the US and the USSR and strained relations during periods of detente. Additionally, the depressed state of the economy during that period was a catalyst for greater interest in Agency employment on the part of recent graduates as well as causing an increased willingness to cooperate with CIA by those interested in service as consultants or external research contractors. Indeed, President Bok in April 1981 wrote the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Presidents of 10 universities urging that the Department of Defense funds be continued for a regional studies association. When the Department responded that it would no longer fund the program alone but only in cooperation with CIA, those joint arrangements were acceptable.

Finally, another aspect of the relationship was the academic community's understanding that the Departments of State and Defense and CIA have been important and valuable supporters of strengthening area and regional studies and foreign language studies in the United States since the early 1950s. The agencies of the American intelligence community as well as the Department

of State have long been a primary source of employment for specialties in these areas. The academic community also consulted closely with senior officials of the intelligence community in their successful campaign to win support for a Congressional-approved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence agencies informally strongly supported this endeavor.

I have reviewed this history because it is important to understand that the relationship between CIA and the university community has flowed hot and cold over the past forty years. Issues that are raised today also were being raised twenty years ago. In some areas, such as on the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree China, our cooperation has remained both close and constant. This also has been the case often in the fields of economics and science. The focus of [discord] has been primarily in the world of the political scientist or in allied social sciences, and particularly among those with expertise in the Third World. There is however another constant in the history of this relationship and in its future as well and that is our need for your help. Let me describe how and why.

Why CIA Needs Academe

CIA and the American government need your help today more than ever before. If you joined CIA, or as a professor dealt with CIA, during the first quarter century of its existence, the odds are that you would have worked on the Soviet Union, China, or in the latter part of that period, Southeast Asia. But the

world has changed dramatically just in the last dozen years. The oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices; the related dramatic changes in the internationl economic system and growth of debt in Third World countries; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the final passage of European colonialism from Africa; a more aggressive and successful Soviet Union (with its Cuban ally) in the Third World; the US defeat in Vietnam; changing patterns in international trade; and the growth of technology transfer, international narcotics networks and terrorism have demonstrated vividly that our national security is affected by developments and events in addition to the number and capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.

Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering in their diversity. They include problems such as the implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World countries, problems of instability and how to forecast it, human rights, narcotics, the grey arms market, the implications of immigration flows in various regions of the world, population trends and their political and security implications, the global food supply, water resources, energy, technology transfer, terrorism, proliferation of chemical/biological and nuclear weapons, changing commodity markets and their implications for Third World countries, and others too numerous to recount. In each of these there are subsets of problems. Take, for example, our knowledge of Shia Islam and its roots in the twelfth century and the importance of that for understanding problems in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The

problems of developing economies in the third world and how they go awry and what opportunities there are for the United States to play a constructive role are all difficult.

But nearly all of these problems have something in common: there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight in the community of university scholars that can help us, and through us, the American government, better understand these problems and their implications for us and for international stability.

With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the Directorate of Intelligence several years ago, initiated an intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think tanks of every stripe, and the business community for information, analysis, advice and counsel. We took the following specific steps.

-- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of concern to us and to encourage participation of our analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300 conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable participation by the academic community and touching on many of the issues that I described a few minutes ago. In addition, our analysts have attended more than 1500 conferences sponsored by others on such problems.

-- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to test our own assessments in ways consistent with protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have helped scholars get security clearances so that they could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A growing percentage of our work is reviewed by specialists in the academic community.

-- We have established panels of cleared specialists from business and the academic community to meet with us regularly to help improve not only specific research papers but to help develop new methodologies, review performance, and help us test new approaches and hypotheses.

-- Our analysts are required to refresh their own substantive credentials and expand their horizons by obtaining outside training at least every two years. This requirement can be met through taking university courses, participating in a series of seminars and conferences, attending military training courses, and so forth.

The different types of our involvement with the academic community are as follows:

-- Recruiting: The vast majority of our analysts still come from university campuses. Indeed, although we are trying, with some success, to diversify the backgrounds of our new officers, the university remains the primary source.

-- Consulting: This can be formal, under a contractual arrangement in which the individual is paid a set government rate, or informal--an exchange of views between interested specialists. We are particularly interested in ideas that challenge conventional wisdom or orthodoxy.

-- Sponsorship of conferences: We generally organize our own, but occasionally contract with others to organize a conference for us. And, of course, our analysts attend conferences sponsored by business, think tanks, and universities.

-- Research: There are cases in which basic, unclassified research can be carried out for us by scholars in universities who have experience and expertise in areas in which we are interested. Basic demographic and economic research are examples of the kind of work for which we contract. The Directorate of Intelligence has no classified contracts with any academic institution.

-- Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with scholars who have traveled to places of interest to us, participated in events of interest abroad, or whose contacts might be of interest. This is, of course, absolutely voluntary.

A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range of issues with which we must cope requires not only dogged research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not famous for their encouragement of these characteristics--although there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to rely solely on intelligence sources or on information funneled through government channels inevitably would constrict the range of views and information needed. We are looking for people to challenge our views, to argue with us, to criticize our assessments constructively, to make us think and defend and go back to the drawing board when we have missed something important. In short, the last thing we want from a scholar is for him or her to tell us what they think we want to hear. That would undermine and obviate our entire effort.

Your Concerns

Let me now address some of the major concerns that have been raised by scholars, deans, and institutions about dealing with us.

1. ~~Working~~ with CIA inevitably will compromise academic freedom and the honesty of academic research.

-- First of all, when we contract for research, we insist on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook the books and we would never consult or contract with a scholar a second time who did that. Our research must stand up to close scrutiny, not only by other intelligence agencies, but by other elements of the executive branch, the oversight committees of the Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's Foreign Intellience Advisory Board, and a variety of other panels and organizations that have access to our information. While we acknowledge we can be and have been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on our reputation for integrity and for reliable and objective assessments. Any research we use should have the same qualities.

-- As I noted above, the whole purpose of our effort is defeated if the scholar tells us what he or she thinks we want to hear. Indeed, there is consistent pressure in our organization to seek out people whom we know disagree with us and against whom to can test our ideas to make sure we have investigated all the possibilities.

-- Third, we have some confidence in the integrity of the university community. We assume that scholars with whom we deal will be straightforward both with us and with their colleagues. We prefer that our contractual relations be open and acknowledged, but are willing to allow them to remain private if it is the wish of an individual and in keeping with the rules of that individual's institution.

-- Academic freedom, it seems to me, depends on a scholar not being beholden to any outside influence but only to the pursuit of truth. Contracts and consultantships with business, other US government organizations, foundations and other funding institutions, and with foreign governments all have the potential to threaten academic freedom and honest research.

-- Finally, I agree with the ~~Church Committee~~ Report Com. that it is the responsibility of the university itself to establish and monitor the rules governing all these relationships. And it is both foolish and irresponsible to do so simply by isolating the scholar from all outside contact to protect academic freedom. Openness is the best safeguard and we support it.

Publicly acknowledged exposure

2. Relations with CIA will hinder the scholar's access and freedom of inquiry both overseas and [redacted]. I acknowledge this as a problem. A scholar who is known to consult with CIA may have difficulty getting a visa for or access in a foreign country. By the same token, many who have worked with us for years have not had a problem. The only reassurance or protection we can offer in this regard is the opportunity to keep our relationship private. Can one reconcile this with the requirement for openness I just noted? Not entirely, but perhaps there could be some middle ground where a scholar could notify university or institutional authorities at least insofar as consultation is concerned, without having that relationship publicized. But if a university requires public exposure of any relationship with CIA, then surely equity requires a similar practice for all other outside relationships.

3. A colleague's association with CIA could compromise an entire department. I have been asked before about the danger of one scholar's association with us involving his or her faculty colleagues through some sort of guilt by association. I acknowledge that this is a potential problem but would offer two observations. First, the university community is a remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many departments there are scholars who are involved in some sort of activity with which their colleagues would be loath to be associated. So, again, this problem is not limited just to

CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on such relationships that could be kept confidential would seem to me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My second observation, however, is that at some point it seems to me a little courage is called for. Remember the adage that "I disagree with what you say but will defend to the death your right to say it." At some point you begin to infringe on the freedom of those who do wish to consult with us because of the fears of their colleagues. We do not believe that working with your government is a shameful activity; indeed, it should be a source of pride and satisfaction.

4. CIA ~~is responsible for~~ engages in collection and analysis covert action, and a variety of "immoral" acts and association with any part of CIA is unacceptable. Activities at CIA are carried out within the law, with the approval of appropriate constitutional authorities, and with the oversight of the Congress. They are activities mandated by the decisions of elected officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches. As we have seen recently Congress can and does deny funds for legal intelligence activities thereby terminating such activities.

-- The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy instrument of the elected representatives of the American people, just like the military, USIA Dept of State. If you find its activities distasteful or incompatible with your personal values, you can do two things: you can vote for someone

else next time and you can decline personally to have any association with us. But in the latter case, the decision whether to associate with us should be left to the individual. One individual's freedom of association should not be denied because of another's personal point of view. A university, or any American institution, steps on precarious ground and itself endangers academic freedom if it starts making arbitrary rules about which organizations a scholar may participate in or talk with -- and, I would add, especially if one of those organizations is a branch of its own democratically chosen government.

Our Rules

Before I close, let me review our rules for dealing with the university community:

-- First, we prefer not to let contracts for classified research. As I stated before, the Directorate of Intelligence has no contracts for classified research at any academic institution.

-- Second, when we contract for research to be done for us, we reserve the right to review that research before publication. The taxpayers justifiably would be justifiably outraged if we were not to ensure that we had received true value for the government's money. You have

seen examples of such outrage in other areas recently. This strikes me as no different than a publisher who wishes to review a manuscript before sending you a check. By the same token, there are always exceptional circumstances and we have the authority to waive this right of review if it seems appropriate.

-- Third, in the past, people who have obtained security clearances to consult with us and thereby gained access to classified information have had to sign secrecy agreements involving a commitment to prepublication review of what they write on their own in the future. A number of scholars have objected to such a broad prepublication review by the Agency in that it commits a scholar whose interests range widely to submit material that has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject where there was access to classified information. I agree that this is inappropriate and we have obtained a change in the rule that will confine prepublication review solely to that area in which there was access to classified information.

-- Fourth, when we help to fund a conference involving participants outside the government or ask someone else to organize a conference on our behalf, our role should be known in advance to all the participants.

-- Fifth, we expect any scholar or individual who consults or works with us to abide fully by the rules of his or her home institution in terms of reporting the relationship with us. But, in our view, it is the responsibility of the institution to set such rules and to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar to comply. CIA cannot and should not monitor or enforce such compliance.

Conclusions

The American Government has been engaged in the last ten years in an experiment unique in history -- that is, whether the intelligence service of a large and powerful country can effectively carry out its responsibilities with full and detailed legislative oversight and an environment of constant exposure in the media of our legitimate activities -- our sources, our assessments and our personnel. There is a constant tension between the clandestine and the open, between keeping secret that which is necessary to allow us to do our work and yet having much of our work exposed day in and day out.

Part of that tension extends to the utility and value of contacts with the academic community. Reaching out for alternative views, unorthodox thinking, challenges to conventional wisdom and criticism are not characteristic of government agencies. An intelligence organization unfortunately is no exception. Those in the academic community and in the

media who believe there should be no contacts between scholars and others in the outside world with intelligence officers have allies inside the organization -- though I believe fewer and fewer.

The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the security and well being of the American people are increasingly diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees believe that contacts with universities and others in the private sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and warning the government about developments around the world -- the same mission identified by General Donovan and President Roosevelt. Our ability to do this, as in the days of Langer and Donovan, depend on the voluntary cooperation between those of us who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and those in the university, business, and other institutions who can help us understand these challenges better and forecast them more accurately. The country is the ultimate beneficiary.

Consultation and cooperation with CIA on substtantive issues and the problems facing our world are not threats to academic freedom. However, those who would deny or disparage a scholar's right, opportunity or willingness to exchange ideas or do unclassified research for us are such a threat. Openness is the surest safeguard of integrity, reputation, and academic freedom.

A final word. Preservation of the liberty of the nation is the first prerequisite of academic freedom. Those who believe that the university community can prosper oblivious to the fortunes of the nation are blind. The government cannot coerce any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense, Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar should be prohibited from or his reputation endangered by a public-spirited, patriotic willingness to cooperate with those charged with protecting our national freedom and well-being.

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Why CIA Needs Academe

CIA and the American government need your help today more than ever before. If you joined CIA, or as a professor dealt with CIA, during the first quarter century of its existence, the odds are that you would have worked on the Soviet Union, China, or in the latter part of that period, Southeast Asia. But the

world has changed dramatically just in the last dozen years. The oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices; the related dramatic changes in the internationl economic system and growth of debt in Third World countries; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the final passage of European colonialism from Africa; a more aggressive and successful Soviet Union (with its Cuban ally) in the Third World; the US defeat in Vietnam; changing patterns in international trade; and the growth of technology transfer, international narcotics networks and terrorism have demonstrated vividly that our national security is affected by developments and events in addition to the number and capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.

Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering in their diversity. They include problems such as the implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World countries, problems of instability and how to forecast it, human rights, narcotics, the grey arms market, the implications of immigration flows in various regions of the world, population trends and their political and security implications, the global food supply, water resources, energy, technology transfer, terrorism, proliferation of chemical/biological and nuclear weapons, changing commodity markets and their implications for Third World countries, and others too numerous to recount. In each of these there are subsets of problems. Take, for example, our knowledge of Shia Islam and its roots in the twelfth century and the importance of that for understanding problems in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The

problems of developing economies in the third world and how they go awry and what opportunities there are for the United States to play a constructive role are all difficult.

But nearly all of these problems have something in common: there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight in the community of university scholars that can help us, and through us, the American government, better understand these problems and their implications for us and for international stability.

With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the Directorate of Intelligence several years ago, initiated an intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think tanks of every stripe, and the business community for information, analysis, advice and counsel. We took the following specific steps.

-- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of concern to us and to encourage participation of our analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300 conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable participation by the academic community and touching on many of the issues that I described a few minutes ago. In addition, our analysts have attended more than 1500 conferences sponsored by others on such problems.

-- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to test our own assessments in ways consistent with protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have helped scholars get security clearances so that they could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A growing percentage of our work is reviewed by specialists in the academic community.

-- We have established panels of cleared specialists from business and the academic community to meet with us regularly to help improve not only specific research papers but to help develop new methodologies, review performance, and help us test new approaches and hypotheses.

-- Our analysts are required to refresh their own substantive credentials and expand their horizons by obtaining outside training at least every two years. This requirement can be met through taking university courses, participating in a series of seminars and conferences, attending military training courses, and so forth.

The different types of our involvement with the academic community are as follows:

-- Recruiting: The vast majority of our analysts still come from university campuses. Indeed, although we are trying, with some success, to diversify the backgrounds of our new officers, the university remains the primary source.

-- Consulting: This can be formal, under a contractual arrangement in which the individual is paid a set government rate, or informal--an exchange of views between interested specialists. We are particularly interested in ideas that challenge conventional wisdom or orthodoxy.

-- Sponsorship of conferences: We generally organize our own, but occasionally contract with others to organize a conference for us. And, of course, our analysts attend conferences sponsored by business, think tanks, and universities.

-- Research: There are cases in which basic, unclassified research can be carried out for us by scholars in universities who have experience and expertise in areas in which we are interested. Basic demographic and economic research are examples of the kind of work for which we contract. The Directorate of Intelligence has no classified contracts with any academic institution.

-- Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with scholars who have traveled to places of interest to us, participated in events of interest abroad, or whose contacts might be of interest. This is, of course, absolutely voluntary.

A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range of issues with which we must cope requires not only dogged research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not famous for their encouragement of these characteristics--although there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to rely solely on intelligence sources or on information funneled through government channels inevitably would constrict the range of views and information needed. We are looking for people to challenge our views, to argue with us, to criticize our assessments constructively, to make us think and defend and go back to the drawing board when we have missed something important. In short, the last thing we want from a scholar is for him or her to tell us what they think we want to hear. That would undermine and obviate our entire effort.

Your Concerns

Let me now address the concerns that have been raised by scholars, deans, and institutions about dealing with us.

Consulting, research support

the US government's

1. Dealing with CIA inevitably will compromise academic freedom and the honesty of academic research.

-- First of all, when we contract for research, we insist on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook the books and we would never consult or contract with a scholar a second time who did that. Our research must stand up to close scrutiny, not only by other intelligence agencies, but by other elements of the executive branch, the oversight committees of the Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and a variety of other panels and organizations that have access to our information. While we acknowledge we can be and have been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on our reputation for integrity and for reliable and objective assessments. Any research we use should have the same qualities.

-- As I noted above, the whole purpose of our effort is defeated if the scholar tells us what he or she thinks we want to hear. Indeed, there is consistent pressure in our organization to seek out people whom we know disagree with us and against whom to can test our ideas to make sure we have investigated all the possibilities.

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-- Third, we have some confidence in the integrity of the university community. We assume that scholars with whom we deal will be straightforward both with us and with their colleagues. We prefer that our contractual relations be open and acknowledged, but are willing to allow them to remain private if it is the wish of an individual and in keeping with the rules of that individual's institution.

-- Academic freedom, it seems to me, depends on a scholar not being beholden to any outside influence but only to the pursuit of truth. Contracts and consultantships with business, other US government organizations, foundations and other funding institutions, and with foreign governments all have the potential to threaten academic freedom and honest research. But

-- Finally, I agree with the Church Committee that it is the responsibility of the university itself to establish and monitor the rules governing all these relationships. And it is both foolish and irresponsible to do so simply by isolating the scholar from all outside contact to protect academic freedom. Openness is the best safeguard and we support it.

Academic freedom means the scholar should be free to search where he will. He should not be constrained by the views of his colleagues in pursuit of truth.

2. Relations with CIA will hinder the scholar's access and freedom of inquiry both overseas and at home. I acknowledge this as a problem. A scholar who is known to consult with CIA may have difficulty getting a visa for or access in a foreign country. By the same token, many who have worked with us for years have not had a problem. The only reassurance or protection we can offer in this regard is the opportunity to keep our relationship private. Can one reconcile this with the requirement for openness noted? Not entirely, but perhaps there could be some middle ground where a scholar could notify university or institutional authorities at least insofar as consultation is concerned, without having that relationship publicized. But if a university requires public exposure of any relationship with CIA, then surely equity requires a similar practice for all other outside relationships.

3. A colleague's association with CIA could compromise an entire department. I have been asked before about the danger of one scholar's association with us involving his or her faculty colleagues through some sort of guilt by association. I acknowledge that this is a potential problem but would offer two observations. First, the university community is a remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many departments there are scholars who are involved in some sort of activity with which their colleagues would be loath to be associated. So, again, this problem is not limited just to

CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on such relationships that could be kept confidential would seem to me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My second observation, however, is that at some point it seems to me a little courage is called for. Remember the adage that "I disagree with what you say but will defend to the death your right to say it." At some point you begin to infringe on the freedom of those who do wish to consult with us because of the fears of their colleagues. We do not believe that working with your government is a shameful activity; indeed, it should be a source of pride and satisfaction.

4. CIA ~~is responsible~~ for covert action, and a variety of "immoral acts and association with any part of CIA is unacceptable. Activities at CIA are carried out within the law, with the approval of appropriate constitutional authorities, and with the oversight of the Congress. They are activities mandated by the decisions of elected officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches. As we have seen recently Congress can and does deny funds for legal intelligence activities thereby terminating such activities.

-- The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy instrument of the elected representatives of the American people, just like the military. If you find its activities distasteful or incompatible with your personal values, you can do two things: you can vote for someone

else next time and you can decline personally to have any association with us. But in the latter case, the decision whether to associate with us should be left to the individual. One individual's freedom of association should not be denied because of another's personal point of view. A university, or any American institution, steps on precarious ground and itself endangers academic freedom if it starts making arbitrary rules about which organizations a scholar may participate in or talk with -- and, I would add, especially if one of those organizations is a branch of its own democratically chosen government.

Our Rules

Before I close, let me review our rules for dealing with the university community:

-- First, we prefer not to let contracts for classified research. As I stated before, the Directorate of Intelligence has no contracts for classified research at any academic institution.

-- Second, when we contract for research to be done for us, we reserve the right to review that research before publication. The taxpayers justifiably would be justifiably outraged if we were not to ensure that we had received true value for the government's money. You have

seen examples of such outrage in other areas recently. This strikes me as no different than a publisher who wishes to review a manuscript before sending you a check. By the same token, there are always exceptional circumstances and we have the authority to waive this right of review if it seems appropriate.

-- Third, in the past, people who have obtained security clearances to consult with us and thereby gained access to classified information have had to sign secrecy agreements involving a commitment to prepublication review of what they write on their own in the future. A number of scholars have objected to such a broad prepublication review by the Agency in that it commits a scholar whose interests range widely to submit material that has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject where there was access to classified information. I agree that this is inappropriate and we have obtained a change in the rule that will confine prepublication review solely to that area in which there was access to classified information.

-- Fourth, when we help to fund a conference involving participants outside the government or ask someone else to organize a conference on our behalf, our role should be known in advance to all the participants.

-- Fifth, we expect any scholar or individual who consults or works with us to abide fully by the rules of his or her home institution in terms of reporting the relationship with us. But, in our view, it is the responsibility of the institution to set such rules and to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar to comply. CIA cannot and should not monitor or enforce such compliance.

Conclusions

The American Government has been engaged in the last ten years in an experiment unique in history -- that is, whether the intelligence service of a large and powerful country can effectively carry out its responsibilities with full and detailed legislative oversight and an environment of constant exposure in the media of our legitimate activities -- our sources, our assessments and our personnel. There is a constant tension between the clandestine and the open, between keeping secret that which is necessary to allow us to do our work and yet having much of our work exposed day in and day out.

Part of that tension extends to the utility and value of contacts with the academic community. Reaching out for alternative views, unorthodox thinking, challenges to conventional wisdom and criticism are not characteristic of government agencies. An intelligence organization unfortunately is no exception. Those in the academic community and in the

media who believe there should be no contacts between scholars and others in the outside world with intelligence officers have allies inside the organization -- though I believe fewer and fewer.

The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the security and well being of the American people are increasingly diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees believe that contacts with universities and others in the private sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and warning the government about developments around the world -- the same mission identified by General Donovan and President Roosevelt. Our ability to do this, as in the days of Langer and Donovan, depend on the voluntary cooperation between those of us who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and those in the university, business, and other institutions who can help us understand these challenges better and forecast them more accurately. The country is the ultimate beneficiary.

Consultation and cooperation with CIA on substtantive issues and the problems facing our world are not threats to academic freedom. However, those who would deny or disparage a scholar's right, opportunity or willingness to exchange ideas or do unclassified research for us are such a threat. Openness is the surest safeguard of integrity, reputation, and academic freedom.

A final word. Preservation of the liberty of the nation is the first prerequisite of academic freedom. Those who believe that the university community can prosper oblivious to the fortunes of the nation are blind. The government cannot coerce any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense, Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar should be prohibited from or his reputation endangered by a public-spirited, patriotic willingness to cooperate with those charged with protecting our national freedom and well-being.